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Preface 
 
 
This report addresses the topic of incorporation of passive safety systems, as currently 
proposed for advanced reactor designs, into future Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) 
studies of accordingly designed future nuclear power plants and discusses, for the different 
degrees of passiveness of such systems, some basic problems with regard to numerical 
estimation of their reliabilities and inclusion of such estimates in plant-specific PSA models.  
 
Further RTD needs to overcome these problems for practical applications are identified.  
 
The relevance of this topic is due to the strong role which PSA is likely to play in future for 
safety verification of advanced reactor designs, such as Generation IV, after it has become 
international consensus among safety experts in the last years that passive safety systems do 
not have a "quasi-zero" failure probability, as was previously often claimed (unreliabilities 
resulting from the case studies performed are in the order of 10-3-10-2). 
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 1. Advanced Reactors and Passive Safety Systems  
 
Forecasted future needs of energy supply in Europe and other developed countries triggered 
during the late 1980's the first research and development activities on advanced reactors, 
which encompass reactor designs of the so-called Generations III, III+ and IV types, as shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Generation I - IV Reactor Types (from http://gen-iv.ne.doe.gov/) 
 
 
Regarding safety, specifically for Generation IV, it is consensus that, among other goals, such 
reactors must have a very low likelihood of core damage, be tolerant of human error and have 
an extremely low probability of accidental offsite release of radiation. Lower core damage 
frequency does not necessarily lead to higher costs. In fact, a focus on economics could result 
in new approaches that simplify the design and operation [1].  
 
Essentially, these goals ask for new safety system designs which are much more reliable, have 
less human involvement for start-up and operation, and are simpler with regard to functional 
dependencies, backups etc.  
 
The approach followed for achieving these safety goals consists of:  
 
• Incorporation of inherent safety characteristics (larger water inventories, negative 
Doppler and moderator temperature coefficients and negative moderator void coefficients 
and larger containment volumes, among other possibilities) and implementation of proven 
high reliability engineered components.  
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 • Use of passive safety systems, at least in some "evolutionary designs"1 and in most of the 
"innovative designs"2, as much for the residual core heat removal as for the mitigation in 
the containment phase (i.e. passive auto catalytic recombiners and core catchers).  
 
Passive systems are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as systems 
that are entirely composed of passive components and structures or that use active ones in a 
very limited way to initiate subsequent passive operation. Components and structures are 
considered passive when no reliance on external forces, power or signal exists [2].  
 
Passive systems are normally used as a second line of defence in the event of failure of an 
active system, though they can also be used as a first line of defence, keeping an active system 
as a second defence line. In some cases of innovative designs, the degree of passiveness in 
the whole design is very large.  
 
T
 
he way IAEA currently classifies passive safety systems is [2]:  
Category A, characterized by: 
• no signal inputs of "intelligence", no external power sources or forces, 
• no moving mechanical parts3, 
• no moving working fluid. 
Examples for Category A systems are physical barriers and static structures (e.g. pipe wall, 
concrete building).  
 
Category B, characterized by: 
• no signal inputs of "intelligence", no external power sources or forces, 
• no moving mechanical parts, but 
• moving working fluids. 
The movement of the fluid is only due to the thermo-hydraulic conditions present when 
activating the safety function. No distinction is made between different types of fluids, 
although this may have significant impact on the availability of the safety function. 
Examples for Category B systems are those based on free convection cooling.  
 
Category C, characterized by: 
• no signal inputs of "intelligence", no external power sources or forces, but 
• moving mechanical parts, independent of presence of moving working fluids. 
The movement of the fluid is characterized as for Category B; mechanical movements are 
due to imbalances within the system (e.g. static pressure in check and relief valves, 
hydrostatic pressure in accumulators) and forces directly exerted by the process. Examples 
for Category C systems are check valves.  
 
Category D: This category addresses the transition area between active and passive where 
the execution of the safety function is made by means of passive methods as described for 
the previous categories, except that internal "intelligence" is not available here to initiate 
                                                 
1 Generation III: ABWR, System 80+, AP-600 and EPR.  
2 Generation III+: EPP-1000, WWER-1000, ESBWR, SWR-1000, CANDU-9, AC-600, WWER-640, MS-600, 
HSBWR, CANDU-6, Indian AHWR, PIUS, ISIS, VPBER-600, JPSR, SPWR; and Generation IV: HTR/VHTR, 
SCWR, GFR, LFR and MSR.  
3 The no-motion requirement does not extend to unavoidable changes in geometry such as thermal expansion. 
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 the passive process, but an external signal ("passive execution / active initiation"). 
Additional criteria for such systems which are related to the initiation process are:  
• energy must be obtained only from stored sources such as batteries or compressed or 
elevated fluids, excluding continuously generated power such as normal AC power 
from continuously operating machinery; 
• use of active components to initiate safety system operation is limited to controls, 
instrumentation and valves (single-action valves relying on stored energy;  
• manual initiation is excluded.  
Examples for Category D systems are scram systems.  
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 2.  Passive System Reliability 
 
 
2.1 Background  
 
Theoretically, a passive system should be much more reliable than an active one as it does not 
need any external input or energy to operate and it relies only upon  
 
• the natural laws of physics (e.g. gravity, natural circulation, convection, etc.) and/or  
 
• inherent characteristics (properties of materials, internally stored energy, etc.) and/or  
 
• "intelligent" use of the energy that is inherently available in the system (e.g. decay heat, 
chemical reactions, etc.) [2,3].  
 
Historically, in the 1980's when passive safety system designs were probably first considered 
explicitly, the attitude of safety analysts has been to allocate an "almost perfect" reliability, i.e. 
probability P≅1, to passive systems and consequently ignored the need for their inclusion in 
PSA or, in general, plant reliability models4. Essentially, the argument was that a passive 
safety system has already a small unavailability to come into operation due to hardware failure 
and human error and that the likelihood of the occurrence of physical phenomena leading to 
pertinent failure modes of the system, once it comes into operation, can be considered zero as 
these phenomena rely entirely on the (deterministic) laws of nature, thus having probability 1 
(of intended operation).  
 
Since the 1990's, however, after observing some real deviations from intended operation 
(failure that control rods fall under gravity, stratification breaking natural convection, 
environmental phenomena diminishing radiation efficiency, etc.), passive systems were started 
to be considered like other engineered systems, i.e. through their physical performances under 
real conditions, and having reliability values P<1. Consequently, a need for inclusion of 
passive systems and their reliability values in PSA arose, making perhaps in future 
"deterministic classifications" unnecessary, such as the one done by the IAEA (see above 
Section 1) [4].  
 
This realization of "non-perfect reliabilities" for passive systems can, in principle, be verified 
in different ways for the different IAEA Categories:  
 
• For Category A passive systems, structural reliability analysis methods can be applied.  
 
• For Categories C and D, sufficient operating experience should be available in order to 
apply the classical tools of statistical reliability analysis.  
 
• Only for Category B systems, i.e. those which rely on natural forces and whose accident 
prevention and mitigation functions are, once the systems are started, not provided by 
means of external power sources (i.e. essentially thermo-hydraulic (T-H) systems), new 
                                                 
4 somewhat similar as it is done in most of current PSA studies with regard to inclusion of conventional passive 
components in PSA models, such as vessels, most of the piping and structures.  
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 methods have to be developed. Here, "non-perfect reliabilities" are generated due to the 
fact that the natural forces which drive the operation of the passive systems have a 
relatively small magnitude, thus enabling possible counter-forces, such as friction, to be of 
comparable, non-ignorable magnitude [5]. For such systems, a need to develop a specific 
quantitative reliability assessment method has been recognised at EU level and the 
development work in a corresponding EU research project will be described in Section 2.2.  
 
 
2.2 An Approach to Quantify Reliability of T-H Passive Systems 
 
 
To address the need to develop a method to quantitatively assess the reliability of Category B 
passive systems as defined in Section 2.1, a research project has been launched by the 
European Commission under its 5th Research Framework Program, called "Reliability 
Methods for Passive Systems" (RMPS), and successfully been concluded in early 2004. Main 
objective of RMPS was to develop a methodology to quantify the reliability of a T-H passive 
system. Three applications were done on three different passive safety systems [7]: The 
Isolation Condenser System (ICS) of a BWR, the Residual Passive heat Removal system of 
the Primary circuit (RP2) of a PWR, and the Hydro-Accumulator of a VVER.  
 
The originality of RMPS is to gather methods coming from different disciplines (T-H, Structural 
Reliability, PSA and Monte Carlo simulation among others) and to further adapt and complete 
them in order to propose an efficient integrated methodology for assessing the reliability of a 
passive safety system.  
 
The RMPS methodology consists of the following main steps (see also Figure 2), [7]:  
 
1) Definition of the accident scenario of interest;  
 
2) Characterisation of the passive safety system in terms of its mission, failure modes 
(FMEA) and success / failure criteria;  
 
3) Modelling of the system by using a T-H computer code and performing best-estimate (BE) 
calculations5;  
 
4) Identification and quantification of the sources of uncertainties and determination of the 
important variables by using expert judgement (EJ);  
 
5) Identification of the relevant parameters which affect accomplishment of system mission 
by using systematic EJ methods such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [8];  
 
6) Quantification of uncertainties and their propagation through the T-H code (or a surrogate 
model obtained by means of, for example, response surface techniques) used to simulate 
the physical process and estimation of the passive system reliability (via common 
statistical estimation or via approximate methods such as FORM/SORM);   
 
                                                 
5 Within RMPS, in order to validate reference calculations and to test different approaches to uncertainty 
analysis, the ICS has been modeled separately by the ATHLET, RELAP5 and CATHARE codes.  
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 7) Incorporation of the estimated reliability of the passive system into the plant-specific 
PSA6.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: RMPS methodology flowchart [7]. 
 
 
The RMPS reliability assessment approach is based on the Resistance-Stress (R-S) model 
taken from Structural Reliability Analysis, where, in the present context, R and S represent a 
system's functional requirement (R) and state (S) and are characterised by their respective 
probability density functions. The structure is supposed to fail whenever the state does not fit 
the requirements. For example, water mass flow circulating through the system could be 
accounted for as physical quantity defining the (passive) system performance; the system 
could be considered to fail if this performance measure goes below a given reference value. In 
                                                 
6 Within RMPS, this last point was, however, only touched and, due to project time constraints, no integration of 
the reliability assessment case studies into a real PSA model could be achieved.  
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 other words, the mission of the passive system defines which parameter values are considered 
a failure by comparing the corresponding probability density functions with the respective, 
deterministically defined safety criteria.  
 
Given a best estimate T-H code and a model of the (passive) system to be analysed, the 
performance function of this system according to its specified mission is given by: 
   M = performance criterion - limit = g(X1, X2,…,Xn) 
in which the Xi (i=1,…,n) are the n basic random input variables (input parameters, split up for 
methodological purposes in this project in design and critical parameters), and g(.) is the 
functional relationship between the random variables and the failure of the system [7]. The 
performance function can be defined such that the limit state, or failure surface, is given by M = 
0. The failure event is defined as the space where M < 0, and the success event as the space 
where M > 0. Thus a probability of failure can be evaluated by the following integral:  
xxX dfP Mf ∫ <= 0 )(  ,        (1) 
where  is the joint density function of X)(xXf 1 ,X2,…, Xn, and the integration is performed over 
the region where M < 0. Because each of the basic random variables has a unique distribution 
and they interact, the integral (1) cannot easily be evaluated. Two types of methods have been 
identified within RMPS to estimate the probability of failure: The Monte Carlo simulation with 
or without variance reduction techniques and some approximate methods (FORM/SORM):  
 
• Direct Monte Carlo simulation techniques can be used to estimate the probability of failure 
defined in equation (1) (or its complement to 1, the reliability). Monte Carlo simulation 
consists of drawing samples of the basic variables according to their probabilistic 
characteristics and then feeding them into the performance function. An estimate of the 
probability of failure P
fPˆ
f can be found by dividing the number of simulation cycles in which 
g(.) < 0 by the total number of simulation cycles N. As N approaches infinity,  approaches 
the true probability of failure. The accuracy of the estimation can be evaluated in terms of its 
variance. For a small number of simulation cycles, the variance of  can be quite large 
compared to the actual value of P
fPˆ
fPˆ
f. Additionally, as a rule of thumb, failure probabilities Pf 
demand sample sizes of at least 1/ Pf in order to get acceptable estimates. Consequently, it 
may take a large number of simulation cycles, mainly if the system is actually a reliable one 
( ), to achieve a relevant accuracy and the amount of computer time 
needed will be large, up to several weeks, especially when each simulation cycle is performed 
by a T-H code. 
33 1010 >⇒≈ − NPf
 
• Variance reduction techniques, such as importance sampling, stratified sampling, Latin 
hypercube sampling, control variates, antithetic variates and directional simulation offer an 
increase in the efficiency and accuracy of the simulation-based assessment of the passive 
system reliability, providing acceptable estimate uncertainty ranges for small number of 
simulation cycles [7].  
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• Approximate methods, such as first- and second-order reliability methods (FORM/SORM) 
consist of 4 steps: 
1. Transformation of the space of the basic random variables X1, X2,…,Xn into a space of 
standard normal variables (N(0,I)); 
2. Determination, in this transformed space, of the point of minimum distance from the 
origin on the limit state surface (this point is called the design point);  
3. Approximation of the failure surface near the design point; 
4. Computation of the failure probability corresponding to the approximate failure surface.  
FORM and SORM apply only to problems where the set of basic variables is continuous. For 
small order probabilities, FORM/SORM are extremely efficient as compared to simulation 
methods. The calculation time is for FORM approximately linear in the number of basic 
variables and independent of the probability level. The drawback of these methods is that 
when the failure surface is not sufficiently smooth, problems arise in determining the design 
point. Additionally, the method does not provide error estimates. Response surface methods 
can help and within RMPS a specific method has been described to build and validate 
response surfaces [7].  
 
• Influence of choice of input distribution on output: Knowledge uncertainty is the main 
source of uncertainty affecting as much design parameters as critical parameters7. This fact 
forces PSA analysts to use EJ as a main source of information for assigning probability 
distributions. Experts some times disagree with each other and some other times change 
their opinion, as more information is available, so that, in many cases, the analysis of the 
system under different input parameter distributions deserves some attention. The codes 
used to calculate the T-H performance of a passive system may require several hours for 
each run. As the evaluation of the reliability of a passive system may require hundreds and 
even thousands of calculations, this poses a serious practical problem when estimating the 
effect of changes in the probabilistic distributions of the input parameters on the system 
reliability. Within RMPS, the efficiency of two methods has been assessed to measure the 
influence of input distribution changes in the means and the distribution functions of the 
output variables (distribution sensitivity analysis), without running again the T-H code: the 
weighting and the rejection methods [9]. Moreover, an extension of the latter method was 
developed to take as much information as possible from the available sample (extended 
rejection method) [12]. All these methods are suitable for measuring the sensitivity to the 
change in one, several or all the input parameters, though with some restrictions. In some 
way, however, the results provided by these methods have to be considered "qualitative", 
since, although one gets quantitative estimates, no test is currently available to check for 
the statistical significance of the differences obtained.  
 
                                                 
7 Design parameters are those that come from the connection of the passive system with the rest of the system, 
while critical parameters are those that characterise the passive system behaviour and account for possible system 
failure causes.  
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 3. Inclusion of Passive Safety Systems in PSA  
 
3.1 Approaches discussed within RMPS  
 
As already mentioned, no definitive agreement was reached within the RMPS project on the 
way how to incorporate passive system reliability into a plant-specific PSA model and only 
conceptual proposals were provided by some of the participants.  
 
It is important to note that the part of the analysis of the reliability of the passive system 
function which deals with possible failures of mechanical components (active initiation), was 
not explicitly included in the RMPS methodology (see also Figure 2), although this is 
obviously necessary for implementation into a real PSA model. In fact, this part was implicitly 
taken into account in the case studies considered, so that the passive systems studied were 
assumed to fail either if the active initiating components failed or if the passive process (here: 
natural circulation) failed. Figure 3 shows in the form of a simple Fault Tree the way how to 
combine both types of failures in order to describe the failure of the entire passive system. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Combination of active components failure and 
physical process failure to describe passive system failure [7]. 
 
 
An alternative approach was provided by one of the participants in the RMPS project [3], 
consisting of two parts: The first part deals with the classical reliability analysis of 
components, the second part with the passive function which is evaluated by means of 
reliability analysis of the components designed to ensure the best conditions for the passive 
safety function (which is the innovative aspect of the proposed method).  
 
This approach is essentially the same as the simple Fault Tree combination proposed in 
Figure 3, but there is a clear difference in the way how to estimate the probability of failure of 
the physical process: In order to achieve the mission of the passive system, there is a set of 
"conventional" devices and components which should perform their respective tasks as 
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 intended (heat exchanger, pipes, vent lines to purge non-condensable gases, etc.) and there is a 
set of physical parameters that could affect the performance of the physical process 
(proportion of non-condensable gases, heat exchanger pipe fouling, etc.). It is suggested in 
reference [3] that relevant failure modes for both types of "components" should be found from 
operating experience and the whole physical process can then be modelled as a classical Fault 
Tree containing these "components". Figures 4-5 show an example of application of this 
method to the case of the ICS treated within RMPS [3].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Fault Tree to describe the modelling of 
the active components failures [3]. 
Figure 5: Fault Tree to describe the modelling of 
the physical process failures [3]. 
 
 
The example in Figure 5 defines the failure of the physical process as either due to an 
insufficient heat transfer to the external heat sunk or due to envelope failure (loss of primary 
boundary) or due to high concentration of non-condensable gases. The different parts of the 
Fault Tree are further developed by taking into account some physical phenomena that could 
impair natural circulation as well as other (active) components. Those physical phenomena are 
further decomposed into failures of other components that could be either active or passive 
(valves, pipes, etc.) following again Fault Tree structures. Later on, failure frequencies are 
assigned to all those components, either through common statistical tools or through EJ.  
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The two main shortcomings of this approach are:  
 
• Failure of the physical process is always (eventually) related to failures of active and 
passive components, not acknowledging any possibility of failure just because of 
unfavourable initial or boundary conditions;  
• The Fault Tree used for the decomposition of the physical process is used as surrogate 
model for a complex T-H code that models system behaviour. This decomposition is not 
good in foreseeing interactions among physical phenomena and makes it extremely 
difficult to realistically assess the impact of parametric uncertainty on the performance of 
the system.  
 
From the quantitative evaluation of the examples studied in the RMPS project [7] and in 
the alternative approach summarised in [3], it becomes clear that the previously 
suspected non-perfect reliabilities of passive safety systems are clearly confirmed 
(resulting unreliabilities in the order of 10-3-10-2).  
 
 
3.2 Inclusion of Passive Safety Systems in Classical PSA Models  
 
On the basis of a classical PSA model, i.e. consisting of largely static Event Trees and Fault 
Trees, the incorporation of a passive safety system into a PSA model could straightforwardly 
be achieved by introducing either an additional heading in the respective Event Tree to 
incorporate the success or failure of the passive safety system or two headings, the first one for 
the (active) initiation components of the passive safety system and the second one for the 
passive execution of the safety function (physical process). This represents incorporation of 
the top event in Figure 3 or of the two events in the lower level of the same figure in the 
respective Event Tree, respectively (see Figures 6-7).  
 
 
Figure 6: Incorporation of a whole passive 
system to an Event Tree as only one heading. 
Figure 7: Incorporation of a passive system into 
an Event Tree as two headings. 
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 If the estimate to be used for the Event Tree heading results from a methodology such as 
RMPS, one should recall the significant computational burdens related to application of such 
methods. For each Initiating Event there could be different initial and boundary conditions, in 
addition to different probability distributions for relevant physical parameters, resulting in the 
need for different sets of computational runs in order to assess with some acceptable accuracy 
the reliability of the system for each Initiating Event. Although the use of variance reduction 
techniques or distribution sensitivity techniques might help, this definitely needs further 
research in order to make "RMPS-type of reliability estimates" applicable for practical 
implementation in plant-specific PSAs.  
 
 
3.3 Inclusion of Passive Safety Systems in Dynamic PSA Models  
 
Static system models, represented by classical Event Tress / Fault Trees ("static PSA 
approach"), fail to reflect correctly the dynamic behaviour of a system. For a large number of 
systems encountered in modern industries, both the process physics and the system 
configuration even under normal operation can change as a result of the complex interaction 
between the components, process variables and the operator actions. It is not clear that the 
static models used in current PSA studies can correctly describe system disturbances 
distributed over time. This basically motivated the development of the time-dependent models 
to complement the classical PSA approach. The need for dynamic system reliability modelling 
was argued in many papers and conferences, showing its advantages against the static PSA 
models [10] and several methods to describe probabilistic system evolution in time were 
proposed during the last decade. 
 
A dynamic system in the context of a reliability study is defined as the system in which 
physical processes are important system characteristics and explicitly define success criteria 
for the system performance. Contrary to static system models (e.g. Event Tress / Fault Trees 
approach), where time determines only chronology of the events, the time variable plays an 
essential role in reliability computations of dynamic systems: The deterministic trajectories of 
the physical processes are influenced at random times by the stochastic changes in the 
structure of the system, by failure, controls or operator actions [11]. 
 
One of the fundamental problems dealing with risk of a technical installation is to evaluate 
possibilities that physical variables representing the system will go across specified (safety) 
performance boundaries. Many practical examples can be given as, for instance, water level in 
a dam reservoir (overtopping may lead to dam breach), temperature of fuel cladding in a 
nuclear reactor (high temperature may lead to fuel melt) or pressure inside a containment of a 
nuclear reactor (high pressure may lead to containment break leading to radioactive release to 
the environment).  
 
In the context of the static PSA approach this problem is hidden within the success criteria for 
the specific systems. Success criteria are defined according to the engineering judgement of 
required system resources to perform a specific task (e.g. to reduce pressure). The engineering 
judgment is usually supported by deterministic calculations of the process behaviour under 
specific accident conditions and component states. The common problem when defining 
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 success criteria is that due to a large number of component states, it is impossible to cover all 
possible scenarios. However, the judgement based on the most evident and conservative 
scenarios may lead to the omission or incorrect scheduling of the functions in the Event Tree. 
 
A nuclear power plant under accident conditions is a dynamic system in which a physical 
process, characterized by a set of partial differential equations and a set of physical variables 
and parameters, interacts with protection systems and random failures of components. In the 
case of a fully passive system, the dynamic approach to reliability analysis would not make 
much sense, since the evolution of the system should sufficiently well be characterised by the 
deterministic equations describing the physical process (see also Section 2.1).  
 
In general, passive systems are not typical systems to be included into dynamic plant models 
at system level. The main feature of passive systems is that once started with some specific 
values of system parameters (e.g. number of trains in operation, percentage of non-
condensable gases, initial pressure, temperature, etc.), the outcome of the system performance 
is deterministic and can be predicted by T-H computations.  
 
As many of the so-called passive safety systems have usually some active components 
included to perform their intended function or have interactions with active systems, some 
parts of such systems are subject to potential failures (tube rupture in heat exchangers, valves, 
etc.) and their inclusion into a "dynamic PSA", i.e. a PSA model consisting essentially of 
dynamic Event Trees, is, in principle, a reasonable option.  
 
Also, there should be no potential problem with the inclusion of passive systems in dynamic 
reliability studies since they do not provide additional simulation problems. Computer codes 
used to simulate natural circulation and similar passive processes are widely used in such 
types of analysis. 
 
However, as dynamic reliability models are more complicated and corresponding 
computations time-consuming, further research is needed in the area of the computational 
challenges posed by dynamic reliability in order to develop more cost-effective methods. 
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 4. Conclusions  
 
Regarding reliability evaluation, the strong reliance of passive safety systems on inherent 
physical principles makes quantification of the reliability of such systems difficult as 
compared to classical systems analysis. As discussed in Section 2 of this report, the main 
problems related to the generation of dependable reliability values for passive safety system 
functions8 are:   
• large T-H uncertainties in the system modelling, 
• the necessary large numbers of simulation cycles and thus long calculations times in 
practical applications,  
• theoretical gaps in the development of uncertainty/sensitivity analysis methodological 
approaches, e.g. missing tests for significance, etc.  
 
One of the most important results from the studies performed so far is the confirmation 
of non-perfect reliabilities of passive safety systems (resulting unreliabilities are in the 
order of 10-3-10-2).  
 
Future RTD efforts here should focus on systematic identification, quantification and 
reduction of uncertainties that appear in the reliability process as well as corresponding 
fundamental research in statistical methods. On this specific topic, JRC-IE is participating in a 
new (November 2004) IAEA Coordinated Research Project on "Natural Circulation 
Phenomena, Modeling and Reliability of Passive Systems that Utilize Natural Circulation" 
with the main task to perform a systematic classification of uncertainties related to the 
modelling of natural circulation phenomena in passive systems (see also 
http://www.energyrisks.jrc.nl).  
 
 
Regarding inclusion of passive systems reliability estimates in future PSA studies, as the 
discussions in Section 3 of this report have shown, merging probabilities with T-H models, i.e. 
dynamic reliability, is necessary for realistic plant safety modelling since the operation of a 
passive safety system in the context of all the other systems of a nuclear power plant is 
strongly dependent on time and its required mission time could be much larger than the 24 
hours typically used in conventional PSA Level 1 applications.  
 
Future RTD efforts here should focus on the further development of dynamic PSA models in 
order to make corresponding applications less time-consuming in terms of computational 
effort involved.  
 
 
                                                 
8 i.e. essentially for Category B systems (see Sections 1 and 2).  
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